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Abstract
We consider a finite time horizon multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in a Bayesian
framework, for which we develop a general set of control policies that leverage ideas
from information relaxations of stochastic dynamic optimization problems. In crude
terms, an information relaxation allows the decision maker (DM) to have access to the
future (unknown) rewards and incorporate them in her optimization problem to pick
an action at time t, but penalizes the decision maker for using this information. In our
setting, the future rewards allow the DM to better estimate the unknown mean reward
parameters of the multiple arms, and optimize her sequence of actions. By picking
different information penalties, the DM can construct a family of policies of increasing
complexity that, for example, include Thompson Sampling and the true optimal (but
intractable) policy as special cases.
We systematically develop this framework of information relaxation sampling, pro-
pose an intuitive family of control policies for our motivating finite time horizon
Bayesian MAB problem, and prove associated structural results and performance
bounds. Numerical experiments suggest that this new class of policies performs well,
in particular in settings where the finite time horizon introduces significant tension in
the problem. Finally, inspired by the finite time horizon Gittins index, we propose
an index policy that builds on our framework that particularly outperforms to the
state-of-the-art algorithms in our numerical experiments.
1. Introduction
Dating back to the earliest work (Bradt et al., 1956; Gittins, 1979), multi-armed bandit
(MAB) problems have been considered within a Bayesian framework, in which the unknown
parameters are modeled as random variables drawn from a known prior distribution. In this
setting, the problem can be viewed as a Markov decision process (MDP) with state that is an
information state describing the beliefs of unknown parameters that evolves stochastically
upon each play of an arm according to Bayes’ rule.
Under the objective of expected performance, where the expectation is taken with re-
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spect to the prior distribution over unknown parameters, the (Bayesian) optimal policy is
characterized by Bellman equations immediately following from the MDP formulation. In
the discounted infinite-horizon setting, the celebrated Gittins index (Gittins, 1979) deter-
mines an optimal policy, despite the fact that its computation is still challenging. In the
non-discounted finite-horizon setting, which we consider, the problem becomes more diffi-
cult (Berry and Fristedt, 1985), and except for some special cases, the Bellman equations
are neither analytically nor numerically tractable, due to the curse of dimensionality. In this
paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal policy (Opt) as an ideal goal that can
be tackled by dynamic programming (DP).
We introduce the information relaxation framework (Brown et al., 2010), a recently de-
veloped technique that provides a systemic way of obtaining the performance bounds on the
optimal policy. It is common in multi-period stochastic DP problems to consider admissible
policies that are required to make decisions based only on the previously revealed informa-
tion. In our framework, we consider the non-anticipativity as a constraint imposed on the
policy space that can be relaxed, as in a usual Lagrangian relaxation. Under such a relax-
ation, the decision maker (DM) is allowed to access to the future information and is asked to
solve an optimization problem so as to maximize her total reward, in the presence penalties
that punish the violation of the non-anticipativity. When the penalties satisfy a condition
(dual feasibility, formally defined in §3), the expected value of maximal reward adjusted by
the penalties provides an upper bound of the expected performance of the (non-anticipating)
optimal policy.
The idea of relaxing the non-anticipativity constraint has been studied over time in the
different contexts (Rockafellar and Wets, 1991; Davis and Karatzas, 1994; Rogers, 2002;
Haugh and Kogan, 2004), and later formulated as a formal framework by Brown et al.
(2010), upon which our methodology is developed. This framework has been applied across
a variety of applications including optimal stopping problems (Desai et al., 2012), linear-
quadratic control (Haugh and Lim, 2012), dynamic portfolio execution (Haugh and Wang,
2014) and others (see Brown and Haugh (2017)).
Our contribution is to apply the information relaxation techniques to the finite-horizon
stochastic MAB problem exploiting the structures of Bayesian learning process. In particular:
1. we propose a series of information relaxations and penalties with increasing complexity;
2. we systematically obtain the upper bounds on the best achievable expected perfor-
mance that are in trade-off between tightness and computational complexity;
3. and, we obtain the associated (randomized) policies that generalize Thompson Sam-
pling (TS) in the finite-horizon setting.
In our framework, which we call information relaxation sampling, each of penalty functions
(and information relaxations) determines one policy and one performance bound given a
particular problem instance specified by the time horizon and prior belief. As a base case
for our algorithms, we have TS (Thompson, 1933) and the conventional regret benchmark
that has been popularized for Bayesian regret analysis since Lai and Robbins (1985). On the
other extreme, the optimal policy Opt and its expected performance follow from the “ideal”
penalty which is intractable to specify. By picking increasingly strict information penalties,
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we can improve the policy and the associated bound between the two extremes of TS and
Opt.
As an illustrating example, one of our algorithms, Irs.FH, provides a very simple mod-
ification of TS that takes into account the length of the time horizon T . Recalling that
TS makes a decision based on sampled parameters from the posterior distribution in each
epoch, we focus on the fact that knowing the parameters is as informative as having an
infinite number of future reward observations in terms of the best arm identification. We let
the policy, say piIrs.FH, to make a decision based on the future Bayesian estimates, updated
with only T − 1 future reward realizations for each arm, where the rewards are randomly
generated based on the posterior belief at the moment. When T = 1 (equivalently, at the
last decision epoch), such a policy takes a myopically best action based only on the current
estimates, which is indeed an optimal decision, whereas TS would still explore unnecessarily.
While keeping the recursive structure in the sequential decision making process of TS, it
naturally performs less exploration than TS as the remaining time horizon diminishes.
Beyond this, we propose other algorithms that more explicitly quantify the benefit of
exploration and more explicitly trade-off exploration versus exploitation, at the cost of addi-
tional computational complexity. As we increase complexity, we achieve policies that improve
performance, and separately provide tighter tractable computational upper bounds on the
expected performance of any policy for a particular problem instance.
2. Notation and Preliminaries
Problem. We consider a classical stochastic MAB problem with K independent arms and
finite-horizon T . At each decision epoch t = 1, · · · , T , the decision maker (DM) pulls an arm
at ∈ A , {1, · · · , K} and earns a stochastic reward associated with arm at. More formally,
the reward from nth pull of arm a is denoted by Ra,n which is independently drawn from
unknown distribution Ra(θa), where θa ∈ Θa is the parameter associated with arm a. We
also have a prior distribution Pa(ya) over unknown parameter θa, where ya ∈ Ya, which we
call belief, is a hyperparameter describing the prior distribution:
θa ∼ Pa(ya), Ra,n|θa ∼ Ra(θa), ∀n ∈ [T ], ∀a ∈ A. (1)
We define two mean reward functions µa(θa) , E [Ra,n|θa] and µ¯a(ya) , Eθa∼Pa(ya) [µa(θa)]
as a function of unknown parameter θa and prior belief ya respectively. Through out the
paper, we assume that the rewards are absolutely integrable over the prior distribution: i.e.,
E [|Ra,n|] <∞ or more explicitly, Eθa∼Pa(ya),r∼Ra(θa) [|r|] <∞ for all a ∈ A.
For brevity, we denote θ , (θ1, · · · , θK) ∈ Θ and y , (y1, · · · , yK) ∈ Y be the vector
of parameters and beliefs across arms, respectively. We additionally define an outcome ω
as a combination of the parameters and all future reward realizations that incorporates all
uncertainties in the environment that the DM encounters:
ω ,
(
θ, (Ra,n)a∈A,n∈[T ]
)
∼ I(T,y) (2)
3
where I(T,y) represents the distribution of outcome.
Policy. Given an action sequence up to time t, a1:t , (a1, · · · , at) ∈ At, define the number of
pulls nt(a1:t, a) ,
∑t
s=1 1{as = a} for each arm a, and the corresponding reward realization
rt(a1:t;ω) , Rat,nt(a1:t,at). The natural filtration Ft(a1:t;ω) , σ
(
T,y, (as, rs(a1:s;ω))s∈[t]
)
encodes the observations revealed up to time t (inclusive).
Let api1:t be the action sequence taken by a policy pi. The (Bayesian) performance of a
policy pi is defined as the expected total reward over the randomness associated with the
outcome, i.e.,
V (pi, T,y) , Eω∼I(T,y)
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t;ω)
]
. (3)
A policy pi is called non-anticipating if its every action apit is Ft−1-measurable, and we define
ΠF be a set of all non-anticipating policies, including randomized ones.
MDP formulation. We assume that we are equipped with a Bayesian update function
Ua : Ya×R 7→ Ya so that after observing Ra,1 = r from an arm a, the belief is updated from
ya to Ua(ya, r) according to Bayes’ rule. We will often use U : Y × A × R 7→ Y to describe
the updating of the entire belief vector y; i.e., after observing Ra,1 = r from some arm a,
the belief vector is updated from y to U(y, a, r) where only the ath component is updated in
this step.
In a Bayesian framework, the MAB problem has a recursive structure. Given a time
horizon T and prior belief y, suppose the DM had just earned r by pulling an arm a at time
t = 1. The remaining problem for the DM is equivalent to a problem with time horizon
T − 1 and prior belief U(y, a, r). We further know the (unconditional) distribution of what
the DM will observe when pulling an arm a, a doubly stochastic random variable, and we
denote it by Ra(Pa(ya)). Following from this Markovian structure, we obtain the Bellman
equations for the MAB problem:
Q∗(T,y, a) , Er∼Ra(Pa(ya)) [r + V ∗(T − 1,U(y, a, r))] (4)
V ∗(T,y) , max
a∈A
Q∗(T,y, a), (5)
with V ∗(0,y) , 0 for all y ∈ Y . While the Bellman equation is intractable to analyze,
it offers a characterization of the Bayesian optimal policy (Opt) and the best achievable
performance V ∗: i.e., V ∗(T,y) = V (Opt, T,y) = suppi∈ΠF V (pi, T,y).
3. Information Relaxation Sampling
We propose a general framework, which we refer to as information relaxation sampling (IRS),
that takes as an input a ‘penalty function’, and produces as outputs a policy and an associ-
ated performance bound.
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Information relaxation penalties and inner problem. If we relax the nonanticipativity
constraint imposed on policy space ΠF (i.e., apit is Ft−1-measurable), the DM will be allowed
to first observe all future outcomes in advance, and then pick an action (i.e., apit is σ(ω)-
measurable). To compensate for this relaxation, we impose a penalty on the DM for violating
the nonanticipativity constraint.
We introduce a penalty function zt(a1:t;ω, T,y) to denote the penalty that the DM incurs
at time t, when taking an action sequence a1:t given a particular instance specified by ω,
T and y. The clairvoyant DM can find the best action sequence that is optimal for a
particular outcome ω in the presence of penalties zt, by solving the following (deterministic)
optimization problem, referred as the inner problem:
maximizea1:T∈AT
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t;ω)− zt(a1:t;ω, T,y). (∗)
Definition 1 (Dual feasibility). A penalty function zt is dual feasible if it is ex-ante zero-mean,
i.e.,
E [zt(a1:t;ω, T,y) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] = 0, ∀a1:t ∈ At, ∀t ∈ [T ] (6)
To clarify the notion of conditional expectation, we remark that the penalty function
zt(·;ω, T,y) is a stochastic function of the action sequence a1:t since the outcome ω is ran-
dom.1 The dual feasibility condition requires that the DM who makes decisions on the
natural filtration will receive zero penalties in expectation.
IRS performance bound. Let W z(T,y) be the expected maximal value of the inner
problem (∗), when the outcome ω is randomly drawn from its prior distribution I(T,y), i.e.,
the expected total payoff that a clairvoyant DM can achieve in the presence of penalties:
W z(T,y) , Eω∼I(T,y)
[
max
a1:T∈AT
{
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t;ω)− zt(a1:t;ω, T,y)
}]
. (7)
We can obtain this value numerically via simulation: draw outcomes ω(1), ω(2), · · · , ω(S)
independently from I(T,y), solve the inner problem for each outcome separately, and then
take the average of the maximal value over samples. The following theorem shows that W z
is indeed a valid performance bound of the stochastic MAB problem.
Theorem 1 (Weak duality and strong duality). If the penalty function zt is dual feasible, W z
is an upper bound on the optimal value V ∗: for any T and y,
(Weak duality) W z(T,y) ≥ V ∗(T,y). (8)
There exists a dual feasible penalty function, referred as the ideal penalty zidealt , such that
(Strong duality) W ideal(T,y) = V ∗(T,y). (9)
1As in usual probability theory, Z(ω) , E[X(ω)|Y (ω)] represents the expected value of a random variable
X(ω) given the information Y (ω), and Z(ω) is itself a random variable that has a dependency on ω.
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The ideal penalty function zidealt has a following functional form:
zidealt (a1:t;ω, T,y) , rt(a1:t;ω)− E [rt(a1:t;ω) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] (10)
+ V ∗ (T − t,yt(a1:t;ω))− E [V ∗ (T − t,yt(a1:t;ω))| Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω)] .
Recall that a dual feasible penalty function does not penalize (in expectation) non-
anticipating policies, which include Opt. Even when the future information is available,
the DM can earn V ∗ under the penalties by implementing Opt without taking advantage of
future information. When she makes use of future information, she can always outperform
Opt, which leads to the weak duality result. The ideal penalty zidealt precisely penalizes for
the additional profit extracted from using the future information, therefore removing any
incentive to deviate from Opt and resulting in the strong duality.
The ideal penalty is, of course, intractable, but its structure tells us what a good penalty
may look like. It implies that there are two sources of additional profit: in DP terminology,
one from knowing future immediate rewards and one from knowing future state transitions,
each of which will be taken into account later in this paper. As another implication, it shows
that relaxing more the available information can always be compensated by adding associ-
ated terms in the penalty function. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the full-information
relaxation (i.e., apit is σ(ω)-measurable), as we do in this paper, in a sense that a partial-
information relaxation (e.g., apit is measurable w.r.t. Gt−1 such that Ft−1 ⊆ Gt−1 ⊆ σ(ω)) is
equivalent to the setting with the full relaxation and a more complicated penalty function.
Under the full-information relaxation, the actual amount of information available for the
DM can be equivalently controlled by adjusting the penalty function.
IRS policy. Given a penalty function zt, we characterize an IRS, possibly randomized,
policy piz ∈ ΠF as follows. The policy piz specifies ‘which arm to pull when the remaining
time is T and current belief is y’. Given T and y, (i) it first samples the outcome ω˜ from
I(T,y) randomly, (ii) solves the inner problem to find a best action sequence a˜∗1:T with respect
to ω˜ in the presence of penalties zt, and (iii) takes the first action a˜∗1 that the clairvoyant
optimal solution a˜∗1:T suggests. Analogous to Thompson sampling, the procedure (i)-(iii) is
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repeated at every decision epoch, while updating the remaining time T and belief y.
Algorithm 1: Information Relaxation Sampling (IRS) policy
Function IRS(T,y; z)
1 Sample an outcome ω˜ ∼ I(T,y)
2 Find the best action sequence with respect to ω˜ under penalties zt:
a˜∗1:T ← argmaxa1:T∈AT
{∑T
t=1 rt(a1:t; ω˜)− zt(a1:t; ω˜, T,y)
}
3 return a˜∗1
Procedure IRS-Outer(T,y; z)
1 y0 ← y
2 for t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
3 Pull at ← IRS(T − t+ 1,yt−1; z)
4 Earn and observe a reward rt and update belief yt ← U(yt−1, at, rt)
end
In step (i), sampling ω˜ ∼ I(T,y) means sampling the parameters θ˜a ∼ Pa(ya) and then
generating the future rewards R˜a,n ∼ Ra(θ˜a) for all n ∈ [T ] and all a ∈ A. It is equivalent
to simulating a plausible future scenario based on the current belief y, and piz takes the
best action optimized to this synthesized future. Note that only the first action a˜∗1 out of
the optimal solution a˜∗1:T is utilized, and at the following decision epoch a new outcome is
sampled from the updated posterior. For a MAB problem with time horizon T , in total, it
solves T different instances of the inner problem throughout the entire decision process.
Remark 1. The ideal penalty yields the Bayesian optimal policy: i.e., V (piideal, T,y) =
V ∗(T,y).
Choice of penalty functions. IRS policies include Thompson Sampling and the Bayesian
optimal policy as two extremal cases. We propose a set of penalty functions spanning these
two. While deferring the detailed explanations in §3.1 - §3.3, we briefly list the penalty
functions:
zTSt (a1:t;ω) , rt(a1:t;ω)− E [rt(a1:t;ω) |θ ] (11)
zIrs.FHt (a1:t;ω) , rt(a1:t;ω)− E [µat(θat) |Rat,1, · · · , Rat,T−1 ] (12)
zIrs.V-Zerot (a1:t;ω) , rt(a1:t;ω)− E [rt(a1:t;ω) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] (13)
zIrs.V-EMaxt (a1:t;ω) , rt(a1:t;ω)− E [rt(a1:t;ω) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] (14)
+WTS (T − t,yt(a1:t;ω))− E
[
WTS (T − t,yt(a1:t;ω))
∣∣∣Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω)]
where yt(a1:t;ω) represents the posterior belief at time t as used in IRS-Outer in Algorithm
1. To help understanding, we provide an identity as an example: E [rt(a1:t;ω) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] =
E [µat(θat) |Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ] = E
[
µat(θat)
∣∣∣Rat,1, · · · , Rat,nt−1(a1:t−1,at) ] = µ¯at ([yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)]at)
– they all represent the mean reward that the DM expects to get from arm at before making
a decision at time t.
Remark 2. All penalty functions (10)-(14) are dual feasible.
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Penalty
function Policy
Performance
bound Inner problem Run time
zTSt TS WTS Find a best arm given parameters. O(K)
zIrs.FHt pi
Irs.FH W Irs.FH Find a best arm given finite observations. O(K) or
O(KT )
zIrs.V-Zerot pi
Irs.V-Zero W Irs.V-Zero Find an optimal allocation of T pulls. O(KT 2)
zIrs.V-EMaxt pi
Irs.V-EMax W Irs.V-EMax Find an optimal action sequence. O(KTK)
zidealt Opt V ∗ Solve Bellman equations. -
Table 1: List of algorithms following from the penalty functions (10)-(14). TS refers to
Thompson sampling and Opt refers to the Bayesian optimal policy. Run time represents the
time complexity of solving one instance of inner problem, representing the time required to
obtain one sample of performance bound or to make a single decision in policy.
Table 1 summarizes our algorithms investigated in this paper. We derive a variety of
penalty designs by exploiting the structures in the causal process of a Bayesian learner.
As we sequentially increase its complexity, from zTS to zideal, the penalty function more
accurately penalizes the benefit of knowing the future outcomes, more explicitly preventing
the DM from exploiting the future information. It makes the inner problem closer to the
original stochastic optimization problem that results in a better performing policy and a
tighter performance bound. As a result, we achieve a family of algorithms that are intuitive
and tractable, exhibiting a trade-off between quality and computational efficiency.
3.1. Thompson Sampling
With the penalty function zTSt (a1:t;ω) , rt(a1:t;ω)− µat(θat), the inner problem (∗) reduces
to
max
a1:T∈AT
{
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t;ω)− zt(a1:t;ω)
}
= max
a1:T∈AT
{
T∑
t=1
µat(θat)
}
= T ×max
a∈A
µa(θa). (15)
Given an outcome ω, in the presence of penalties, a hindsight optimal action sequence is to
keep pulling one arm a∗1 = argmaxa µa(θa), T times in a row. The resulting performance
bound is equivalent to the conventional regret benchmark, i.e.,
WTS(T,y) = E
[
T ×max
a∈A
µa(θa)
]
(16)
which measures how much the DM could have achieved if the parameters are revealed in
advance. The corresponding IRS policy piTS is equivalent to Thompson Sampling: when the
sampled outcome ω˜ is used instead, it pulls the arm argmaxa µa(θ˜a) where each θ˜a ∼ Pa(ya),
and this sampling-based decision making is repeated at each epoch, while updating the belief
sequentially, as described in IRS-Outer in Algorithm 1.
Note that the optimal solution is determined by the parameters θ only – it does not
need to consider the future rewards, and thus it takes O(K) computations to make a single
decision in policy or to obtain a single sample of performance bound.
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3.2. IRS.FH
Let µa,T−1(ω) be the expected mean reward of an arm a inferred from T−1 reward realizations
Ra,1, · · · , Ra,T−1. Given (12), the optimal solution to the inner problem (∗) is to pull an arm
with the highest µa,T−1(ω) from beginning to the end:
µa,T−1(ω) , E [µa(θa) |Ra,1, · · · , Ra,T−1 ] , W Irs.FH(T,y) = E
[
T ×max
a∈A
µa,T−1(ω)
]
. (17)
Irs.FH is almost identical to TS except that µa(θa) is replaced with µa,T−1(ω). Note that
µa,T−1(ω) is less informative than µa(θa) from the DM’s perspective, since she will never be
able to learn µa(θa) perfectly within a finite horizon. In terms of mean reward estimation,
knowing the parameters is equivalent to having the infinite number of observations. The
inner problem of TS asks the DM to “identify the best arm based on the infinite number
of samples” whereas that of Irs.FH asks her to “identify the best arm based on the finite
number of samples”, which takes into account the length of time horizon explicitly.
Focusing on the randomness of µa(θa) and µa,T−1(ω), we observe that the distribution
of µa,T−1(ω) will be more concentrated around its mean µ¯a(ya). Following from Jensen’s
inequality, we have W Irs.FH ≤ WTS for any problem instance, saying that Irs.FH yields a
performance bound tighter than the conventional benchmark. In terms of policy, the vari-
ance of µa,T−1(ω˜) (and µa(θa)) also governs the degree of random exploration, deviating from
the myopic decision of pulling an arm with the largest µ¯a(ya). When it approaches the end
of the horizon (T ↘ 1), piIrs.FH naturally explores less than TS.
Sampling µa,T−1(ω˜) at once. In order to obtain µa,T−1(ω˜) for a synthesized outcome ω˜,
one may apply Bayes’ rule sequentially for each reward realization, which will take O(KT )
computations in total. It can be done in O(K) if the prior distribution Pa is a conjugate
prior of the reward distribution Ra, in which the belief can be updated in a batch by
the use of sufficient statistics of observations. In the case of the Beta-Bernoulli MAB or
the Gaussian MAB, for example, µa,T−1(ω˜) can be represented as a convex combination
of the current estimate µ¯a(ya) and the sample mean 1T−1
∑T−1
n=1 R˜a,n−1. We further know
that the distribution of ∑T−1n=1 R˜a,n−1 is Binomial(T − 1, θ˜a) for the Beta-Bernoulli case, and
N ((T−1)·θ˜a, (T−1)·σ2a) for the Gaussian case, where σ2a represents the noise variance. After
sampling the parameter θ˜a, we can sample
∑T−1
n=1 R˜a,n−1 directly from the known distribution,
and use it to compute µa,T−1(ω˜) without sequentially updating the belief. In such cases, a
single decision of piIrs.FH can be made within O(K) operations, similar in complexity to TS.
3.3. IRS.V-Zero and IRS.V-EMax
IRS.V-Zero. Let µa,n(ω) be the expected mean reward of arm a inferred from the first n
reward realizations:
µa,n(ω) , E [µa(θa) |Ra,1, · · · , Ra,n ] . (18)
Under this penalty, the DM earns µa,n−1(ω) from the nth pull of an arm a: for example, if
a1:T = (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1), the total payoff is µ1,0 + µ2,0 + µ2,1 + µ2,2 + µ2,3 + µ1,1.
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Given an outcome ω, the total payoff is determined only by the total number of pulls of
each arm, and not the sequence in which the arms had been pulled. Therefore, solving the
inner problem (∗) is equivalent to “finding the optimal allocation (n∗1, n∗2, · · · , n∗K) among T
remaining opportunities”: omitting ω for brevity, the inner problem reduces to
max
a1:T∈AT
{
T∑
t=1
µat,nt−1(a1:t−1,at)
}
= max
a1:T∈AT

K∑
a=1
nT (a1:T ,a)∑
n=1
µa,n−1
 = maxn1:K∈NT
{
K∑
a=1
Sa,na
}
(19)
where Sa,n ,
∑n
m=1 µa,m−1 is the cumulative payoff from the first n pulls of an arm a, and
NT , {(n1, · · · , nK) ∈ ZK+ :
∑N
a=1 na = T} is the set of all feasible allocations. Once the Sa,n’s
are computed, this inner problem can be solved within O(KT 2) operations by sequentially
applying sup convolution K times. The detailed implementation is provided in §A.1.
Given an optimal allocation n˜∗, the policy piIrs.V-Zero needs to select which arm to pull
next. In principle, any arm a that was included in the solution of the inner problem, n˜∗a > 0,
would be fine, but we suggest a selection rule in which the arm that needs most pulls is
chosen, i.e., argmaxa n˜∗a. It guarantees piIrs.V-Zero to behave like TS when T is large, as
formally stated in Proposition 1.
IRS.V-EMax. Irs.V-EMax includes an additional cost for using the information of fu-
ture belief transitions. Compared to the ideal penalty zidealt (10), zIrs.V-EMaxt (14) is ob-
tained by replacing the true value function V ∗(T,y) with WTS(T,y) (16), as a tractable
approximation. The use of WTS leads to a simple expression for the conditional expecta-
tion with respect to the natural filtration. Since θ|Ft−1 is distributed with P(yt−1), we have
E
[
WTS (T − t,yt)
∣∣∣Ft−1] = (T−t)×E [maxa µa(θa)| Ft−1] = (T−t)×Eθ∼P(yt−1) [maxa µa(θa)] =
WTS (T − t,yt−1).
We observe that, given ω, the future belief yt(a1:t;ω) is completely determined by how
many times each arm had been pulled, irrespective of the sequence of the pulls. For example,
consider two action sequences aA1:t = (1, 1, 2, 1, 2) and aB1:t = (2, 1, 1, 2, 1). Even though the
order of observations would differ, the agent will observe (R1,1, R1,2, R1,3) from arm 1 and
(R2,1, R2,2) from arm 2 in both cases that end up with the same belief yt(aA1:t;ω) = yt(aB1:t;ω).
Following from the observation above, the state (belief) space can be efficiently parame-
terized with the pull counts n1:K = (n1, · · · , nK) instead of action sequence a1:t. Since the
total number of possible future beliefs is O(TK), not O(KT ), the inner problem (∗) can be
solved by dynamic programming in O(cWTK + KTK) operations, where cW is the cost of
numerically calculating WTS(T,y) (see §A.2 for the detail).
IRS.Index policy. Finally, we propose Irs.Index, which does not strictly belong to the
IRS framework, and does not produce a performance bound, but it exhibits strong empirical
performance.
Roughly speaking, Irs.Index approximates the finite-horizon Gittins index (Kaufmann
et al., 2012) using Irs.V-EMax. For each arm in isolation, it internally solves the single-
armed bandit problem in which there is a competing outside option that yields a deterministic
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(known) reward. Applying Irs.V-EMax to a single-armed bandit problem, we can find if
the stochastic arm is worth trying against a particular value of outside option in O(KT ). The
threshold value that makes the arm barely worth trying can be obtained by binary search,
repeatedly solving the singe-armed bandit problems while varying the value of outside option.
The policy piIrs.Index plays an arm with the largest threshold value. See §A.3.
4. Analysis
Remark 3 (Optimality at the end). When T = 1, all piIrs.FH, piIrs.V-Zero, piIrs.V-Emax, and
piIrs.Index take the optimal action that is pulling the myopically best arm a∗ = argmaxa µ¯a(ya).
Proposition 1 (Asymptotic behavior). Assume µi(θi) 6= µj(θj) almost surely for any two
distinct arms i 6= j. As T ↗ ∞, the distribution of Irs.FH’s action converges to that of
Thompson Sampling:
lim
T→∞
P [Irs.FH(T,y) = a] = P [TS(y) = a] , ∀a ∈ A. (20)
Similarly, so does Irs.V-Zero2:
lim
T→∞
P [Irs.V-Zero(T,y) = a] = P [TS(y) = a] , ∀a ∈ A. (21)
TS, Irs.FH(T,y) and Irs.V-Zero(T,y) denote the action taken by policies piTS, piIrs.FH
and piIrs.V-Zero, repsectively, when the remaining time is T and the prior belief is y. These
are random variables, since each of these policies uses a randomly sampled outcome ω˜ on its
own.
Remark 3 and Proposition 1 state that Irs.FH and Irs.V-Zero behave like TS dur-
ing the initial decision epochs, gradually shift toward the myopic scheme and end up with
optimal decision; in contrast, TS will continue to explore throughout. The transition from
exploration to exploitation under these IRS policies occurs smoothly, without relying on an
auxiliary control parameter. While maintaining their recursive structure, IRS policies take
into account the horizon T , and naturally balance exploitation and exploration.
Theorem 2 (Monotonicity in performance bounds). Irs.FH and Irs.V-Zero monotonically
improve the performance bound:
WTS(T,y) ≥ W Irs.FH(T,y) ≥ W Irs.V-Zero(T,y). (22)
Note that WTS(T,y) = Eθ∼P(y) [T ×maxa µa(θa)] is the conventional regret benchmark.
In addition, we have W Irs.V-EMax ≥ W ideal since W ideal is the lowest attainable upper
bound (Theorem 1). Empirically (§D), we also observe W Irs.V-Zero ≥ W Irs.V-EMax.
We interpret that the tightness of performance bound W z − V ∗ reflects the degree of
optimism that each algorithm would possess. Recall that W z is the expected value of the
2We assume a particular selection rule such that aIrs.V-Zero = argmaxa n˜∗a as discussed in §3.3.
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best possible payoff when the agent is informed with some future outcomes in advance. The
weak duality W z ≥ V ∗ implies that IRS algorithms are basically optimistic in a sense that
the agent would believe that she can earn more than the optimal policy in a hope that the
additional information is true. Even with the same outcome ω, depending on the penalties
zt, the agent would have different anticipation about the future payoff. As we incorporate
the actual learning process, the agent’s anticipation becomes less optimistic and the perfor-
mance bound gets tighter.
We define the ‘suboptimality gap’ of an IRS policy piz to be W z(T,y)− V (piz, T,y), and
analyze it instead of the conventional (Bayesian) regret, WTS(T,y)− V (piz, T,y). While its
non-negativity is guaranteed from weak duality (Theorem 1), more desirably, the optimal
policy yields a zero suboptimality gap (Theorem 1 & Remark 1). It coincides with the
conventional regret measure only for TS.
Theorem 3 (Suboptimality gap). For the Beta-Bernoulli MAB, for any T and y,
WTS(T,y)− V (piTS, T,y) ≤ 3K + 2
√
log T × 2
√
KT (23)
W Irs.FH(T,y)− V (piIrs.FH, T,y) ≤ 3K + 2
√
log T ×
(
2
√
KT − 13
√
T/K
)
(24)
W Irs.V-Zero(T,y)− V (piIrs.V-Zero, T,y) ≤ 2K +
√
log T ×
(
2
√
KT − 13
√
T/K
)
(25)
We do not have a theoretical guarantee for monotonicity in the actual performance
V (piz, T,y) among IRS policies. Instead, Theorem 3 indirectly shows the improvements in
suboptmality: although all the bounds have the same asymptotic order of O(
√
KT log T ),3
the IRS policies improve the leading coefficient or the additional term.
The proof of Theorem 3, provided in C.4, relies on an interesting property of IRS policies,
which is a generalization of TS. Russo and Van Roy (2014) observed that TS is randomized
in a way that, conditional on the past observations, the probability of choosing an action
a equals to the probability that the action a is chosen by someone who knows the parame-
ters. Analogously, the IRS policy piz is randomized in a way that, conditional on the past
observations and the past actions, the probability of choosing an action a matches the prob-
ability that the action a is chosen by someone who knows the entire future but penalized
(see Proposition 7). Recall that the penalties are designed to penalize the gain of having
additional future information. A better choice of penalty function prevents the policy piz
from picking up an action that is overly optimized to a randomly sampled future realization,
which in turn improves the quality of the decision making.
3Bubeck and Liu (2013) had shown that the Bayesian regret of TS is bounded by 14
√
KT when the
rewards have a bounded support in [0, 1] including Beta-Bernoulli MAB. Despite of its lower asymptotic
order, however, the actual number given in (23) is tighter than 14
√
KT for small T . As a side note, Lai
(1987) showed that the Bayesian regret of the optimal policy has an asymptotic lower bound of O(log2 T ).
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5. Numerical Experiments
We visualize the effectiveness of IRS policies and performance bounds in case of Gaussian
MAB with five arms (K = 5) with different noise variances. More specifically, each arm
a ∈ A has the unknown mean reward θa ∼ N (0, 12) and yields the stochastic rewards
Ra,n ∼ N (θa, σ2a) where σ1 = 0.1, σ2 = 0.4, σ3 = 1.0, σ4 = 4.0 and σ5 = 10.0. Our exper-
iment includes the state-of-the-art algorithms that are particularly suitable in a Bayesian
framework: Bayesian Upper Confidence Bound (Bayes-UCB, Kaufmann et al. (2012), with
a quantile of 1− 1
t
), Information Directed Sampling (IDS, Russo and Van Roy (2017)), and
Optimistic Gittins Index (OGI, Farias and Gutin (2016), one-step look ahead approximation
with a discount factor of γt = 1− 1t ). Irs.V-EMax algorithm is omitted here because of its
time complexity. In §D, we provide the detailed simulation procedures and the results for
the other settings including Irs.V-EMax.
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Figure 1: Regret plot for Gaussian MAB with five arms whose noise variances are different.
The solid lines represent the (Bayesian) regret of algorithms, WTS(T,y)− V (pi, T,y), and the
dashed lines represent the regret bounds that IRS algorithms produce, WTS(T,y)−W z(T,y).
The times on the top left corner represent the average length of time required to simulate each
policy for a single problem instance with T = 500.
Figure 1 shows the Bayesian regrets (solid lines, WTS(T,y) − V (pi, T,y)) and the regret
bounds (dashed lines, WTS(T,y) −W z(T,y)) that are measured at the different values of
T = 5, 10, · · · , 500. Note that lower regret curves are better, and higher bound curves are
better. Also, the regret bound produced by TS is zero, since WTS(T,y) is the benchmark
(16) used in this regret plot.
We first observe a clear improvement in both performances and bounds as we incorporate
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more complicated penalty functions from TS to Irs.V-Zero. As stated in Theorem 2, the
monotonicity in the bound curves can be observed. The suboptimality gap (the gap between
a regret curve and its corresponding bound curve) gets tightened, which is consistent with
the implication of Theorem 3. As a trade-off, however, it requires a longer running time.
In this particular example, it is crucial to incorporate how much we can learn about
each of the arms during the remaining time periods, which heavily depends on the noise
level σa.4 Comparing Irs.FH with TS, as a simple modification for finite-horizon setting,
the performance has improved significantly without degrading its computational efficiency.
We also observe that IRS policies and IDS outperform to Bayes-UCB, OGI and TS
algorithms, since they explicitly incorporate the value of exploration – how quickly the
posterior distribution will be concentrated upon each observation.
This example also illustrates us the significance of having a tighter performance bound.
Benchmarking toW Irs.V-Zero, when T = 500, Irs.Index* policy achieves 94%
(
= V (piIrs.Index*,T,y)
W Irs.V-Zero(T,y)
)
of it. If the conventional benchmark WTS is used instead, as in a usual regret analysis, we
might have concluded that Irs.Index* only achieves 88%
(
= V (piIrs.Index*,T,y)
WTS(T,y)
)
of that (looser)
bound, which may suggest a larger margin of possible improvement.
4In order for the posterior distribution to be concentrated so as to have the standard deviation of 0.1, for
example, one observation is enough for arm 1 whereas 100 and 10,000 observations are required for arm 3
and arm 5, respectively.
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A. Algorithms in Detail
A.1. Implementation of IRS.V-Zero
We provide a pseudo-code of piIrs.V-Zero introduced in §3.3. The same logic can be directly
used to compute the performance bound W Irs.V-Zero if the sampled outcome ω˜ is replaced
with the true outcome ω.
Algorithm 2: Irs.V-Zero policy
Function Irs.V-Zero(T,y)
1 θ˜a ∼ Pa(ya), R˜a,n ∼ Ra(θ˜),∀n ∈ [T ],∀a ∈ [K]
2 for a = 1, · · · , K do
3 y˜a,0 ← ya, S˜a,0 ← 0
4 for n = 1, · · · , T do
5 S˜a,n ← S˜a,n−1 + µ¯a(y˜a,n−1)
6 y˜a,n ← Ua(y˜a,n−1, R˜a,n)
end
end
7 M˜0,0 ← 0, M˜0,n ← −∞,∀n = 1, · · · , T
8 for a = 1, · · · , K do
9 for n = 0, · · · , T do
10 M˜a,n ← max0≤m≤n{M˜a−1,n−m + S˜a,m}
11 A˜a,n ← argmax0≤m≤n{M˜a−1,n−m + S˜a,m}
end
end
12 m← T
13 for a = K, · · · , 1 do
14 n˜∗a ← A˜a,m
15 m← m− n˜∗a
end
16 return argmaxa n˜∗a
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A.2. Implementation of IRS.V-EMax
Given the penalty function zIrs.V-EMaxt defined in (14), we define the payoff of pulling an arm
a one more time after pulling each arm a′, na′ times: with n1:K , (n1, · · · , nK) ∈ ZK ,
rz(n1:K , a;ω) , µ¯a([yt(n1:K ;ω)]a)−WTS (T − t− 1,yt+1(n1:K + ea;ω)) (26)
+WTS (T − t− 1,yt(n1:K ;ω))
where ea ∈ ZK is a basis vector such that ath component is one and the others are zero.
Note that we used the fact that E
[
WTS (T − t,yt)
∣∣∣Ft−1] = WTS (T − t,yt−1). We also use
the notation of yt(n1:K ;ω) to denote the belief as a function of pull counts n1:K , based on
the observation that the belief is completely determined by how many times each arm was
pulled, n1:K , no matter in what order they were pulled.
Consider a subproblem of (∗) such that maximizes the total payoff given the number of
pulls n1:K across arm: with t =
∑K
a=1 na,
M(n1:K ;ω) , max
a1:t∈At
{
t∑
s=1
rs(a1:s;ω)− zIrs.V-EMaxs (a1:s;ω);
t∑
s=1
1{as = a} = na,∀a
}
. (27)
Then, it should satisfy
M(n1:K ;ω) = max
a∈A
{M(n1:K − ea;ω) + rz(n1:K − ea, a;ω); na ≥ 1} . (28)
For all feasible counts n1:K ’s such that
∑K
a=1 na ≤ T , we can compute M(n1:K ;ω)’s by
sequentially solving (28) in an appropriate order. After all, we can obtain the maximal value
to original inner problem (∗) by evaluating
max
n1:K
{
M(n1:K ;ω);
K∑
a=1
na = T
}
. (29)
The optimal action sequence a∗1:T can be elicited by tracking M(n1:K , ω)’s backward.
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Algorithm 3: Irs.V-EMax policy
Function Irs.V-EMax(T,y)
1 Sample an outcome ω˜ ∼ I(T,y)
2 y˜a,0 ← ya, y˜a,n ← Ua(y˜a,n−1, R˜a,n), ∀n ∈ [T ], ∀a ∈ [K]
3 for each n1:K ∈ N≤T do
4 Γ˜[n1:K ]← Eθ∼P(y˜(n1:K)) [maxa µa(θa)]
end
5 for each n1:K ∈ N<T do
6 r˜z[n1:K , a]← µ¯a(y˜a,na−1) +
(
T −∑Ka=1 na − 1)× (Γ˜[n1:K ]− Γ˜[n1:K + ea]) , ∀a
end
7 M˜ [0]← 0
8 for each n1:K ∈ N≤T \ {0} in order do
9 M˜ [n1:K ]← maxa
{
M˜ [n1:K − ea] + r˜z[n1:K − ea, a]
}
10 A˜[n1:K ]← argmaxa
{
M˜ [n1:K − ea] + r˜z[n1:K − ea, a]
}
end
11 m1:K ← argmax
{
M˜ [n1:K ];
∑
a na = T
}
12 for t = T, · · · , 1 do
13 a˜∗t ← A˜[m1:K ]
14 ma˜∗t ← ma˜∗t − 1
end
15 return a˜∗1
Here, y˜(n1:K) , (y˜1,n1 , · · · , y˜K,nK ), N≤T , {n1:K ;
∑
a na ≤ T}, N<T , {n1:K ;
∑
a na < T},
and in line 8, n1:K iterates over N≤T \ {0} in an order that ∑Ka=1 na is non-decreasing.
Since |N≤T | = O(TK), it requires O(KTK) operations to compute all M(n1:K , ω)’s. How-
ever, another practical issue is the cost of computing WTS(T,y) = T ×Eθ∼P(y) [maxa µa(θa)]
which has to be evaluated O(TK) times in total. In general, there is no simple closed form
expression in general, and it should be evaluated with numerical integration or sampling.
A.3. IRS.Index Policy
Single-armed bandit problem. Consider a problem with a single arm a that yields
stochastic rewards Ra,n ∼ Ra(θa) and with an outside option that yields a deterministic
reward λ. We have a prior distribution Pa(ya) over unknown parameter θa whereas the
deterministic reward λ is known apriori.
Given an outcome ω, we have the future belief trajectory (ya,n)n∈{0,··· ,T} where ya,n is the
belief after observing first n rewards.
ya,0 , ya, ya,n , Ua(ya,n−1, Ra,n), ∀n ∈ [T ] (30)
We adopt the penalty function zIrs.V-EMaxt in which the true value function V ∗(T, ya, λ) is
approximated by WTS(T, ya, λ) = Eθa∼Pa(ya) [T ×max{µa(θa), λ}]. We define A , {0, 1}
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such that at = 1 if pulling the stochastic arm and at = 0 if choosing the outside option at
time t. The associated inner problem is
maximize
T∑
t=1
µa,nt−1 · 1{at = 1}+ λ · 1{at = 0} − (T − t)×
(
Γλnt − Γλnt−1
)
(31)
subject to nt =
t∑
s=1
1{at = 1}, at ∈ {0, 1}, ∀t = 1, · · · , T (32)
where µa,n , µ¯a(ya,n) and
Γλn , Eθa∼Pa(ya,n) [max(µa(θa), λ)] . (33)
Proposition 2. The optimization problem (31) can be reformulated as
max
0≤n≤T
{
T × Γλ0 + (T − n)×
(
λ− min
0≤s≤n
Γλs
)
+
n∑
s=1
(
µa,s−1 − Γλs−1
)}
. (34)
Here, the decision variable n is the total number of pulls of stochastic arm.
Proof. Fix m , nT . Note that if at = 0, (T − t) × (Γλnt − Γλnt−1) = 0 since nt = nt−1. The
objective function can be represented as
m∑
n=1
µa,n−1 + (T −m)× λ−
m∑
n=1
(T − tn)×
(
Γλn − Γλn−1
)
(35)
where tn , inf{t;nt ≥ n}. It suffices to find (t1, · · · , tm) with 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · < tm ≤ T
that minimize ∑mn=1(T − tn)× (Γλn − Γλn−1). With t0 , 0 and tm+1 , T + 1, note that
m∑
n=1
(T − tn)×
(
Γλn − Γλn−1
)
=
m∑
n=1
(T − tn)× Γλn −
m∑
n=1
(T − tn)× Γλn−1 (36)
=
m∑
n=1
(T − tn)× Γλn −
m−1∑
n=0
(T − tn+1)× Γλn (37)
=
m∑
n=0
(T − tn)× Γλn − (T − t0)× Γλ0 −
m∑
n=0
(T − tn+1)× Γλn + (T − tm+1)× Γλm
(38)
= −Γλm − T × Γλ0 +
m∑
n=0
(tn+1 − tn)× Γλn (39)
In order to minimize (39), we need to set tn∗+1 − tn∗ = T −m+ 1 for n∗ , argmin0≤n≤m Γλn
and tn+1 − tn = 1 for n 6= n∗. For such tn’s, (35) reduces to
m∑
n=1
µa,n−1 + (T −m)× λ−
(
−Γλm − T × Γλ0 +
m∑
n=0
Γλn + (T −m)× min0≤n≤mΓ
λ
m
)
(40)
=
m∑
n=1
µa,n−1 + (T −m)×
(
λ− min
0≤n≤m
Γλm
)
+ T × Γλ0 −
m−1∑
n=0
Γλn. (41)
By taking its maximum value over m = 0, · · · , T , we obtain (34). 
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Let ϕa(λ) be the (maximal) relative benefit of pulling the stochastic arm against not
pulling.
ϕa(λ) , max1≤n≤T
{
T × Γλ0 + (T − n)×
(
λ− min
0≤s≤n
Γλs
)
+
n∑
s=1
(
µa,s−1 − Γλs−1
)}
− T × λ (42)
Note that max was taken over n ≥ 1. We interpret that, given the future belief trajec-
tory (ya,n)n∈{0,··· ,T}, the stochastic arm is worth trying against the deterministic reward λ if
ϕa(λ) ≥ 0 and not worth trying if ϕa(λ) < 0.
The value of ϕa(λ) can be computed in O(T ) operations by precalculating
∑n
s=1 µa,s−1,
min0≤s≤n Γλs and
∑n
s=1 Γλs−1 over n = 1, · · · , T sequentially. The single-armed bandit problem
has an additional advantage in terms of computational efficiency: WTS often admits a closed
form expression. In cases of the Beta-Bernoulli MAB and the Gaussian MAB,
Eθ∼Beta(α,β) [max (θ, λ)] = λ× F betaα,β (λ) +
α
α + β ×
(
1− F betaα+1,β (λ)
)
(43)
Eθ∼N (m,ν−2) [max (θ, λ)] = m+ (λ−m)× Φ (ν(λ−m)) + ν−1 × φ (ν(λ−m)) (44)
where F betaα,β (·) represents c.d.f. of Beta(α, β) distribution, Φ(·) and φ(·) represent c.d.f. and
p.d.f. of standard normal distribution. With these expressions, Γλn’s can be computed very
efficiently without using numerical integration or sampling in contrast to the multi-armed
case of Irs.V-EMax.
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Algorithm 4: Irs.Index Policy
Function Irs.Single.Worth-Trying(a, T, λ, (y˜a,n)n∈{0,··· ,T})
1 Γ˜λn ← Eθa∼Pa(y˜a,n) [max(µa(θa), λ)] ,∀n = 0, · · · , T
2 S˜µa,0 ← 0, S˜Γ0 ← 0, m˜Γ0 ← Γ˜λ0
3 for n = 1, · · · , T do
4 S˜µa,n ← S˜µa,n−1 + µ¯a(y˜a,n−1)
5 S˜Γn ← S˜Γa,n−1 + Γ˜λn
6 m˜Γn ← min
(
m˜Γn−1, Γ˜λn−1
)
end
7 ϕ˜a ← max1≤n≤T
{
S˜µa,n + T × Γ˜λ0 + (T − n)×
(
λ− m˜Γn
)
− S˜Γn
}
− T × λ
8 if ϕ˜a ≥ 0 then
9 return true
else
10 return false
end
Function Irs.Index(T,y)
11 Sample an outcome ω˜ ∼ I(T,y)
12 y˜a,0 ← ya, y˜a,n ← Ua(y˜a,n−1, R˜a,n), ∀n ∈ [T ], ∀a ∈ [K]
13 for a = 1, · · · , K do
14 λ˜∗a ← inf
{
λ; Irs.Single.Worth-Trying(a, T, λ, (y˜a,n)n∈{0,··· ,T}) = true
}
end
15 return argmaxa λ˜∗a
Index policy. We now return to the original MAB problem with K arms. Recall that the
single-arm bandit algorithm tells us whether an arm (given a sampled future) is worth trying
against the deterministic reward λ. We use the algorithm as a module to compute the index
of each arm.
More specifically, for each arm a = 1, · · · , K seperately, Irs.Index policy samples the
future belief trajectory {y˜a,n}n∈{0,··· ,T} and finds a threshold deterministic reward that makes
the arm barely worth trying:
λ˜∗a , sup {λ ∈ R ; ϕ˜a(λ) ≥ 0} . (45)
Although the monotonicity of ϕ˜a(·) is not theoretically proven, we observe that the binary
search works well in our numerical experiments.
The value λ˜∗a is used as the index of an arm a. Irs.Index policy chooses the arm
argmaxa λ˜∗a with the largest index. The entire procedure for single decision making requires
O(cb ×KT ) operations where cb represents the number of iterations in binary search.
Some numerical experiment include a heuristic variation of index policy, Irs.Index*,
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that is obtained by using
ϕa(λ) , max1≤n≤T
{
n∑
s=1
(
µa,s−1 − λ−
(
Γλs − Γλ0
))}
(46)
instead of (42).
B. Proofs for §3
Proposition 3 (Mean equivalence). If the penalty function zt is dual feasible, it does not
penalize any non-anticipating policy pi ∈ ΠF in expectation, i.e.,
Epiω∼I(T,y)
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t;ω)− zt(api1:t;ω)
]
= Epiω∼I(T,y)
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t;ω)
]
≡ V (pi, T,y). (47)
Proof. We define an appending operator ⊕ that concatenates an element into a vector such
that a1:t ≡ a1:t−1 ⊕ at. When pi ∈ ΠF and zt is dual feasible, omitting ω for brevity,
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− zt(api1:t)
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− E [zt(api1:t)| Ft−1]
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− E
[
K∑
a=1
zt(api1:t−1 ⊕ a) · 1{apit = a}
∣∣∣∣∣Ft−1
]]
= E
 T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− K∑
a=1
E
[
zt(api1:t−1 ⊕ a)
∣∣∣Ft−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
·1{apit = a}


= E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)
]
.

B.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Week duality. Define Gt , Ft∪σ(ω) and consider a relaxed policy space ΠG , {pi : apit is Gt−1-measurable, ∀t}.
Then, we have
V ∗(T,y) , sup
pi∈ΠF
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)
]
Prop 3= sup
pi∈ΠF
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− zt(api1:t; )
]
≤ sup
pi∈ΠG
E
[
T∑
t=1
rt(api1:t)− zt(api1:t)
]
= E
[
max
a1:T∈AT
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t)− zt(a1:t)
]
= W z(T,y)
since ΠF ⊆ ΠG. 
22
Strong duality. Fix T and y. Let V int (a1:t−1;ω) and Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω) be the value function
and Q-value function associated with the inner problem (∗) given a particular outcome ω
under the ideal penalty (10). With V inT+1 ≡ 0, we have the Bellman equations for the inner
problem:
Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω) , rt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω)− zidealt (a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) + V int+1(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) (48)
V int (a1:t−1;ω) = max
a∈A
{
Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω)
}
(49)
We argue by induction to show that
V int (a1:t−1;ω) = V ∗(T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (50)
Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω) = Q∗(T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω), a) (51)
for all a1:t−1 ∈ At−1, a ∈ A and t ∈ [T ].
As a terminal case, when t = T + 1, the claim holds trivially, since V int (a1:T ;ω) = 0 =
V ∗(0,yT (a1:T ;ω)). Now assume that the claim holds for t + 1: V int+1(a1:t;ω) = V ∗(T −
t,yt(a1:t;ω)) for all a1:t ∈ At. For any a1:t−1 ∈ At−1 and a ∈ A, then,
Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω) = rt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω)− zidealt (a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) + V int+1(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) (52)
= E [rt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) + V ∗ (T − t,yt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω))| Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω)] (53)
−V ∗ (T − t,yt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω)) + V int+1(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(54)
= E [rt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω) + V ∗ (T − t,yt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω))| Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω)] (55)
= Er∼Ra(Pa([yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)]a)) [r + V ∗ (T − t,U(yt−1(a1:t−1;ω), a, r))] (56)
= Q∗(T − t,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω), a) (57)
where the last equality follows from the original Bellman equation (4). Consequently,
V int (a1:t−1;ω) = max
a∈A
{
Qint (a1:t−1, a;ω)
}
(58)
= max
a∈A
{Q∗(T − t,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω), a)} (59)
= V ∗(T − t,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (60)
Therefore the claim holds for all t = 1, · · · , T . In particular for t = 1, we have
V in1 (∅;ω) = V ∗(T,y), Qin1 (∅, a;ω) = Q∗(T,y, a), ∀ω. (61)
Note that the maximal value of inner problem does not depend on ω – deterministic with
respect to the randomness of ω. As its expected value, W ideal(T,y) = V ∗(T,y). 
B.2. Proof of Remark 1
We continue on the proof of strong duality. piideal solves the same inner problem with respect
to a randomly sampled outcome ω˜. When the remaining time is T and the current belief is
y, it takes an action with the largest Q-value: together with (61),
api
ideal = argmax
a
Qin1 (∅, a; ω˜) = argmax
a
Q∗(T,y, a). (62)
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Therefore, at each moment, no matter what ω˜ is chosen, the policy piideal always takes the
same action that Bayesian optimal policy would choose. Although there might be some
ambiguity regarding tie-breaking in argmax, it does not affect the expected performance.
Therefore, V (piideal, T,y) = V ∗(T,y). 
B.3. Proof of Remark 2
Except zIrs.FHt , all the other penalty functions have a form of zt = Xt−E [Xt|Gt−1] such that
Gt−1 ⊇ Ft−1. Since E [E (Xt|Gt−1)| Ft−1] = E [Xt| Ft−1] by Tower property, E [zt| Ft−1] =
E [Xt − E [Xt|Gt−1]| Ft−1] = 0.
For zIrs.FHt (12), observe that
E [E (µat(θat) |Rat,1, · · · , Rat,T−1 )| Ft−1] = E
[
E
(
µat(θat)
∣∣∣{Ra,n}a∈A,n∈[T−1])∣∣∣Ft−1]
= E [µat(θat)| Ft−1] = E [rt(a1:t;ω)| Ft−1]
and thus E
[
zIrs.FHt |Ft−1
]
= 0. 
C. Proofs for §4
Within this section, without loss of generality, we redefine the outcome ω to include an
infinite number of future reward realizations:
ω , (Ra,n)a∈A,n∈N . (63)
The original definition of outcome (2) can be thought as a truncated version of (63), in which
only the first T reward realizations are adopted for each arm. Although ω does not contain
θ, having an infinite number of rewards is sufficient since µa(θa) = limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1Ra,i by
Proposition 5.
With this new definition, we can describe the distribution of outcome irrespectively of T
and we denote it with I(y) (one can imagine I(∞,y) with respect to the original definition).
C.1. Notes on Regularity
Proposition 4. If E|Ra,n| <∞ for all a,
E|µa(θa)| <∞ and WTS(T,y) <∞ (64)
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality,
E|µa(θa)| = E [|E (Ra,n|θa)|] ≤ E [E ( |Ra,n|| θa)] ≤ E|Ra,n| <∞ (65)
Consequently,
E
[
max
a
µa(θa)
]
≤ E
[
K∑
a=1
|µa(θa)|
]
=
K∑
a=1
E|µa(θa)| <∞ (66)
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
Proposition 5. If E|Ra,n| <∞,
lim
n→∞µa,n(ω) = limn→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ra,i = µa(θa) almost surely (67)
where µa,n(ω) , E [µa(θa)|Ra,1, · · · , Ra,n] defined in (18).
Proof. Fix a and letHn , σ (Ra,1, · · · , Ra,n). First note that, by SLLN, limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1Ra,i =
µa(θa) almost surely. Therefore, µa(θa) isH∞-measurable. Also note that µa,n = E (µa(θa)|Hn)
is a Doob’s Martingale adapted to Hn. By Levy’s upward theorem, since µa(θa) ∈ L1 by
Proposition 4, µa,n converges to E (µa(θa)|H∞) = µa(θa) almost surely as n→∞. 
C.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Asymptotic behavior of Irs.FH. Let ω˜ be the sampled outcome used inside of Irs.FH(T,y).
Following from Proposition 5, we have limn→∞ µa,n(ω˜) = µa(θ˜a) for almost all ω˜. Together
with the assumption that µi(θi) 6= µj(θj) for i 6= j, since argmaxa µa(θ˜a) is uniquely defined
for almost all ω˜, we have
lim
n→∞ argmaxa µa,n(ω˜) = argmaxa µa(θ˜a) a.s. (68)
Since the almost sure convergence guarantees the convergence in distribution, for any a,
lim
T→∞
P [Irs.FH(T,y) = a] = lim
T→∞
P
[
argmax
a′
µa′,T−1(ω˜) = a
]
(69)
= P
[
argmax
a′
µa′(θ˜a′) = a
]
(70)
= P [TS(y) = a] (71)
Note that we are not particularly assuming that Irs.FH(T,y) and TS(y) share the ran-
domness. The sampled parameters used in TS(y) may not be necessarily same to that of
Irs.FH(T,y), but their distribution is identical since they are given the same prior. 
Asymptotic behavior of Irs.V-Zero. We drop ω˜ for brevity in what follows, but we use
the notation of x˜ to indicate the dependency of x on ω˜. Let a˜◦T = Irs.V-Zero(T,y) in
which ω˜ is used, and let a˜TS , argmaxa µa(θ˜a). Similar to above, it suffices to show that
limT→∞ a˜◦T = a˜TS for almost all ω˜.
Define
∆˜ , min
a6=a˜TS
∣∣∣µa˜TS(θ˜a˜TS)− µa(θ˜a)∣∣∣ and M˜ , sup
a∈A,n≥0
|µ˜a,n| . (72)
We have 0 < ∆˜ < 2M˜ <∞ almost surely since µi(θ˜i) 6= µj(θ˜j) for i 6= j and limn→∞ µ˜a,n =
µa(θ˜a) <∞ almost surely for all a. In addition, there exists N˜ ∈ N such that∣∣∣µ˜a,n − µa(θ˜a)∣∣∣ < ∆˜4 , ∀n ≥ N˜ , ∀a ∈ A (73)
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For such N˜ , we have
inf
n≥N˜
µ˜a˜TS,n ≥ sup
n≥N˜
µ˜a,n +
∆˜
2 , ∀a 6= a˜
TS (74)
Note that a˜TS, ∆˜, M˜ and N˜ are determined only by ω˜, regardless of T .
To argue by contradiction, suppose a˜◦T 6= a˜TS for some large T such that T ≥ 2N˜+ 8M˜N˜∆˜ +2.
Define the optimal solution to the inner problem of Irs.V-Zero:
n˜◦1:K , argmaxn1:K
{
K∑
a=1
na∑
s=1
µ˜a,s−1 ;
K∑
a=1
n(a) = T
}
(75)
where the ties are broken arbitrarily in argmax{}. Given Irs.V-Zero’s selection rule
a˜◦T = argmaxa n˜◦(a), the assumption a˜◦T 6= a˜TS implies that n˜◦(a˜◦T ) ≥ bT2 c (> N˜).
Case 1: If n˜◦(a˜TS) ≥ N˜ , consider a deviation of pulling a˜TS one more time but pulling
a˜◦T one less time: define n˜
†
1:K such that n˜†(a˜TS) = n˜◦(a˜TS) + 1, n˜†(a˜◦T ) = n˜◦(a˜◦T ) − 1 and
n˜†(a) = n˜◦(a) for a /∈ {a˜TS, a˜◦T}. Then, since n˜◦(a˜TS) ≥ N˜ and n˜◦(a˜◦T ) ≥ N˜ , by (74),
K∑
a=1
n˜†(a)∑
s=1
µ˜a,s−1 −
K∑
a=1
n˜◦(a)∑
s=1
µ˜a,s−1 = µ˜a˜TS,n˜◦(a˜TS) − µ˜a˜◦T ,n˜◦(a˜◦T )−1 ≥
∆˜
2 > 0 (76)
The allocation n˜†1:K achieves a strictly better payoff than n˜◦1:K , which contradicts to the
assumption that n˜◦1:K is an optimal allocation.
Case 2: If n˜◦(a˜TS) < N˜ , consider a deviation n˜†1:K such that
n˜†(a) ,

n˜◦(a˜TS) + (n˜◦(a˜◦T )− N˜) if a = a˜TS
N˜ if a = a˜◦T
n˜◦(a) otherwise
(77)
By making this change,
K∑
a=1
n˜†(a)∑
s=1
µ˜a,s−1 −
K∑
a=1
n˜◦(a)∑
s=1
µ˜a,s−1 (78)
=
n˜◦(a˜TS)+(n˜◦(a˜◦T )−N˜)∑
s=n˜◦(a˜TS)+1
µ˜a˜TS,s−1 −
n˜◦(a˜◦T )∑
s=N˜+1
µ˜a˜◦T ,s−1 (79)
≥ −(N˜ − n˜◦(a˜TS)) · 2M˜ +
n˜◦(a˜◦T )∑
s=N˜+1
µ˜a˜TS,s−1 −
n˜◦(a˜◦T )∑
s=N˜+1
µ˜a˜◦T ,s−1 (80)
≥ −(N˜ − n˜◦(a˜TS)) · 2M˜ + (n˜◦(a˜◦T )− N˜) ·
∆
2 (81)
≥ (n˜◦(a˜◦T )− N˜) ·
∆
2 − 2N˜M˜ (82)
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Since T ≥ 2N˜ + 8M˜N˜∆˜ + 2 and n˜◦(a˜◦T ) ≥ bT2 c, the last term is strictly positive, which means
that n˜†1:K is strictly better than n˜◦1:K . We got a contradiction.
We’ve shown that for almost all ω˜, when T is large enough, the optimal solution n˜◦1:K
must impose more than a half of the pulls on the arm a˜TS = argmaxa µa(θ˜a). Therefore,
limT→∞ a˜◦T = a˜TS for almost all ω˜, which completes the proof.
C.3. Proof of Theorem 2
The first inequalityWTS(T,y) ≥ W Irs.FH(T,y) immediately follows from Jensen’s inequality:
since max(· · · ) is a convex function,
E
[
max
a
µa(θa)
]
≥ E
[
max
a
E (µa(θa)|Ra,1, · · · , Ra,T−1)
]
. (83)
To show W Irs.FH(T,y) ≥ W Irs.V-Zero(T,y), we need to modify Jensen’s inequality a bit.
Lemma 1 (Variant of Jensen’s inequality). Suppose ϕ : R 7→ R is a non-decreasing (de-
terministic) function. Then, for any real-valued random variable X such that E|X| < ∞,
E [max {X + ϕ(X), 0}] ≥ E [max {E(X) + ϕ(X), 0}] . (84)
Proof. Define µ , E(X) and fx(t) , max{t + ϕ(x), 0}. Since fx(·) is a convex function for each
x ∈ R,
fx(t) ≥ fx(µ) + (t− µ) · f ′x(µ) = max{µ+ ϕ(x), 0}+ (t− µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(x) ≥ 0}, ∀t, ∀x (85)
By setting t = x,
max{x+ ϕ(x), 0} = fx(x) ≥ max{µ+ ϕ(x), 0}+ (x− µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(x) ≥ 0}, ∀x (86)
Note that, since 1{µ+ϕ(x) ≥ 0} is increasing in x, (i) for any x ≥ µ, (x−µ) ≥ 0 and 1{µ+ϕ(x)} ≥
1{µ+ ϕ(µ)}, and (ii) for any x < µ, (x− µ) < 0 and 1{µ+ ϕ(x)} ≤ 1{µ+ ϕ(µ)}. Therefore,
(x− µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(x) ≥ 0} ≥ (x− µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(µ) ≥ 0}, ∀x ∈ R (87)
Combining with (86),
max{x+ ϕ(x), 0} ≥ max{µ+ ϕ(x), 0}+ (x− µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(µ) ≥ 0}, ∀x ∈ R (88)
For random variable X, by taking expectation,
E [max{X + ϕ(X), 0}] ≥ E [max{µ+ ϕ(X), 0}+ (X − µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(µ) ≥ 0}] (89)
≥ E [max{µ+ ϕ(X), 0}] + E(X − µ) · 1{µ+ ϕ(µ) ≥ 0} (90)
= E [max{µ+ ϕ(X), 0}] (91)

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Corollary 1. On a probability space (Ω,F ,P), suppose ϕ(x, ω) : R × Ω 7→ R be a function
such that (i) the mapping x 7→ ϕ(x, ω) is non-decreasing for each ω ∈ Ω and (ii) for some
sub-σ-field H ⊆ F , the mapping ω 7→ ϕ(x, ω) is H-measurable for each x ∈ R (i.e., ϕ(·, ω)
is a deterministic function conditioned on H). Then
E [max {X(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] ≥ E [max {E(X|H)(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] (92)
Proof. Define
µ(ω) , E(X|H)(ω), I(ω) , 1{µ(ω) + ϕ(µ(ω), ω) ≥ 0} (93)
Following from (88), we have
max{x+ϕ(x, ω), 0} ≥ max{µ(ω)+ϕ(x, ω), 0}+(x−µ(ω)) ·I(ω), ∀x ∈ R, for each ω ∈ Ω (94)
Since µ(ω) and I(ω) are H-measurable,
E [max{X(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] ≥ E [max{µ(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}+ (X(ω)− µ(ω)) · I(ω)] (95)
= E [E (max{µ(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}+ (X(ω)− µ(ω)) · I(ω)|H)](96)
= E [max{µ(ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] + E [E ((X(ω)− µ(ω)) · I(ω)|H)](97)
= E [max{E (X|H) (ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] (98)
+E
(E(X|H)(ω)− µ(ω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
·I(ω)
 (99)
= E [max{E (X|H) (ω) + ϕ(X(ω), ω), 0}] (100)

Corollary 2. On a probability space (Ω,F ,P), let (C0, · · · , CT ) be H-measurable real-
valued random variables for some sub-σ-field H ⊆ F (i.e., Ci’s are constants conditioned
on H). Then
E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
(i− n)+ ×X + Ci
}]
≥ E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
E (X|H) · 1{i ≥ n+ 1}+ (i− n− 1)+ ×X + Ci
}]
(101)
for any n = 0, 1, · · · , T .
Proof. When n = T , both sides become E [max0≤i≤T {Ci}] which makes the claim true. Fix n < T
and define
ϕ(x, ω) , max
n+1≤i≤T
{(i− n− 1)× x+ Ci(ω)} − max0≤i≤n {Ci(ω)} . (102)
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Note that ϕ(x, ω) satisfies the conditions in Corollary 1. Therefore,
E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
(i− n)+ ×X + Ci
}]
(103)
= E
[
max
{
max
n+1≤i≤T
{(i− n)×X + Ci} , max0≤i≤nCi
}]
(104)
= E
[
max
{
X + max
n+1≤i≤T
{(i− n− 1)×X + Ci} , max0≤i≤nCi
}]
(105)
= E
max
X(ω) + maxn+1≤i≤T {(i− n− 1)×X(ω) + Ci(ω)} − max0≤i≤nCi(ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ϕ(X(ω),ω)
, 0
+ max0≤i≤nCi(ω)

(106)
Cor 1≥ E
[
max
{
E (X|H) (ω) + max
n+1≤i≤T
{(i− n− 1)×X(ω) + Ci(ω)} − max0≤i≤nCi(ω), 0
}
+ max
0≤i≤n
Ci(ω)
]
(107)
= E
[
max
{
max
n+1≤i≤T
{E (X|H) + (i− n− 1)×X + Ci} , max0≤i≤nCi
}]
(108)
= E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
E (X|H) · 1{i ≥ n+ 1}+ (i− n− 1)+ ×X + Ci
}]
(109)

Proof of W Irs.FH(T,y) ≥ W Irs.V-Zero(T,y). Define
NT ,
{
n1:K ∈ ZK+ :
K∑
a=1
na = T
}
and Sa(na) ,
na∑
s=1
µa,s−1 (110)
What we want to show is
W Irs.FH ≡ E
[
T ×max
a
{µa,T−1}
]
= E
[
max
n1:K∈NT
{
K∑
a=1
na × µa,T−1
}]
(111)
≥ E
[
max
n1:K∈NT
{
K∑
a=1
Sa(na)
}]
≡W Irs.V-Zero. (112)
Further define
Uk,n , E
 max
n1:K∈NT

(
k−1∑
a=1
Sa(na)
)
+
(
Sk(nk ∧ n) + (nk − n)+ × µk,T−1
)
+
 K∑
a=k+1
na × µa,T−1


(113)
where a ∧ b , min(a, b). Observe that W Irs.FH = U1,0, W Irs.V-Zero = UK,T and Uk+1,0 = Uk,T .
Therefore, it suffices to show that
Uk,n ≥ Uk,n+1, ∀k = 1, · · · ,K, ∀n = 0, · · · , T − 1. (114)
Fix k and n. Define a sub-σ-field
H , σ ({Ra,s}a=k,s≤n ∪ {Ra,s}a6=k,s≤T−1) . (115)
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For each i = 0, · · · , T , define
Ci , maxn1:K∈NT

(
k−1∑
a=1
Sa(na)
)
+ Sk(i ∧ n) +
 K∑
a=k+1
na × µa,T−1
 ; nk = i
 . (116)
Note that Ci’s are H-measurable and
Uk,n = E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
(i− n)+ × µk,T−1 + Ci
}]
(117)
With X , µk,T−1, by Corollary 2,
Uk,n = E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
(i− n)+ ×X + Ci
}]
(118)
Cor 2≥ E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
E (X|H) · 1{i ≥ n+ 1}+ (i− n− 1)+ ×X + Ci
}]
(119)
(a)= E
[
max
0≤i≤T
{
µk,n · 1{i ≥ n+ 1}+ (i− n− 1)+ × µk,T−1 + Ci
}]
(120)
(b)= Uk,n+1 (121)
(a) holds since E (X|H) = E (µk,T−1|H) = E (µk,T−1|Rk,1, · · · , Rk,n) = µk,n, and (b) holds since
Sk(i ∧ n) + µk,n · 1{i ≥ n+ 1} =
∑n
s=1 µk,s−1 · 1{i ≥ s}+ µk,n · 1{i ≥ n+ 1} =
∑n+1
s=1 µk,s−1 · 1{i ≥
s} = Sk(i ∧ (n+ 1)). 
C.4. Proof of Theorem 3
As in §B.1, we define Q-values of inner problem with respect to a particular outcome ω, a
penalty function zt(·), a time horizon T and a prior belief y.
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a;ω, T,y) = rt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω)− zt(a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω, T,y) (122)
+V z,int+1 (a1:t−1 ⊕ a;ω, T,y)
V z,int (a1:t−1;ω, T,y) = max
a∈A
{
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a;ω, T,y)
}
(123)
with V z,inT+1(·;ω, T,y) ≡ 0. Additionally define
Sz(a1:T ;ω, T,y) ,
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t;ω)− zt(a1:t;ω, T,y) (124)
az,∗t (a1:t−1;ω, T,y) , argmax
a∈A
{
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a;ω, T,y)
}
(125)
We have V z,in1 (∅;ω, T,y) = maxa1:T∈AT Sz(a1:T ;ω, T,y).
Proposition 6 (Suboptimality decomposition). Given a policy pi ∈ ΠF and a dual feasible
penalty function zt,
W z(T,y)− V (pi, T,y) = E
[
max
a1:T
{Sz(a1:T ;ω, T,y)} − Sz(api1:T ;ω, T,y)
]
(126)
= E
[
T∑
t=1
max
a′
{
Qz,int (api1:t−1, a′;ω, T,y)
}
−Qz,int (api1:t−1, apit ;ω, T,y)
]
(127)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of outcome ω and the random-
ness of policy pi.
Proof. The first equality immediately follows from the definition of W z and the mean-
equivalence (Proposition 3). Now fix ω, T and y. Consider the (pathwise) suboptimality
of a particular action sequence a1:T compared to the clairvoyant optimal solution. It can
decomposed into the suboptimalty gap of individual actions over time.
max
a′1:T
{Sz(a′1:T )} − Sz(a1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
max
a′
{
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a′)
}
−Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) (128)
By taking expectation, we obtain the second equality. 
We continue with the extended definition of outcome (63). Define a shift operator Mt :
At × Ω 7→ Ω.
Mt(a1:t, ω) , (Ra,na ;∀na > nt(a1:t, a),∀a ∈ A) (129)
Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω) encodes the remaining reward realizations after taking a1:t−1.
Remark 4 (Recursive structure of remaining uncertainties). Conditioned on Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω), the
remaining uncertainties are sufficiently described by yt−1(a1:t−1;ω).
Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω)| Ft−1(a1:t−1;ω) ∼ I(yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (130)
Remark 5 (Recursive structure in IRS penalties). Each of the penalty functions (10)-(14) has
the following form
zt(a1:t;ω, T,y) = ϕz(Mt−1(a1:t−1;ω), T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (131)
for some function ϕz : Ω×N×Y 7→ R: the penalty is completely determined by the remaining
rewards Mt−1(a1:t−1;ω), the remaining time horizon T − t + 1 and the belief yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)
at that moment.
Remark 4 immediately follows from Bayes’ rule, and Remark 5 can be easily verified. We
observe a recursive structure in the sequential inner problems that the DM solves throughout
the decision making process, characterized by the following property.
Proposition 7 (Generalized posterior sampling). For any of penalty functions (10)-(14), the
IRS policy piz is randomized in a way that it chooses an action a with the probability that the
action a is indeed the best action az,∗t at that moment: i.e.,
P
[
api
z
t = a
∣∣∣Ft−1] = P [az,∗t = a| Ft−1] , ∀a, ∀t. (132)
The source of uncertainty in LHS is the randomness of decision maker (embedded in ω˜) and
that of RHS is the randomness of nature (embedded in ω). az,∗t abbreviates az,∗t (api
z
1:t−1;ω, T,y)
defined in (125) and Ft−1 abbreviates Ft−1(apiz1:t−1;ω). Here we assume that the tie-breaking
rule in argmax of (125) is identical to the one used in piz when solving the inner problem.
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Proof. Fix t, a1:t−1 and ω. First, az,∗t is the best action that maximizes payoff in the remaining
periods:
az,∗t (a1:t−1;ω, T,y) = argmax
a′t
{
max
a′t+1:T
T∑
s=t
rs(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s;ω)− zs(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s;ω, T,y)
}
(133)
Following from Remark 5, for any s ∈ [t, T ],
zs(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s;ω, T,y) (134)
= ϕz(Ms−1(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s−1;ω), T − s+ 1,ys−1(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s−1;ω,y)) (135)
= ϕz(Ms−t(a′t:s−1;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω)), (T − t+ 1) + (s− t),ys−t(a′t:s−1;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω),yt−1(a1:t−1;ω))
(136)
= zs−t+1(a′t:s;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω), T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (137)
Similarly for rewards, we have rs(a1:t−1 ⊕ a′t:s;ω) = rs−t+1(a′t:s;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω)). Therefore, (134)
is reformulated as
az,∗t = argmax
a′t
{
max
a′t+1:T
T∑
s=t
rs−t+1(a′t:s;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω))− zs−t+1(a′t:s;Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω), T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω))
}
(138)
Next, consider the IRS policy’s action apizt . It internally solves an instance of inner problem
with sampled outcome ω˜ ∼ I(yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)), the remaining horizon T − t+ 1 and the prior belief
yt−1(a1:t−1;ω):
api
z
t = argmax
a′1
{
max
a′2:T−t+1
T−t+1∑
s=1
rs(a′1:s; ω˜)− zs(a′1:s; ω˜, T − t+ 1,yt−1(a1:t−1;ω))
}
. (139)
Comparing (138) and (139), we observe that they have the identical functional forms except
Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω) is replaced with ω˜. Since Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω)|Ft−1 ∼ I(yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)) (Remark 4)
and ω˜ ∼ I(yt−1(a1:t−1;ω)),
P
[
az,∗t (Mt−1(a1:t−1, ω)) = a
∣∣Ft−1] = P [apizt (ω˜) = a∣∣∣Ft−1] . (140)

Proof outline of Theorem 3. From now on, we restrict our attention to the Beta-Bernoulli
MAB. We basically mirror the proof of Russo and Van Roy (2014) while generalizing the
meaning of posterior sampling.
For each of penalty functions zTSt , zIrs.FHt and zIrs.V-Zerot , we will construct a confidence
interval process {(La,t, Ua,t)}a∈A,t∈[T ] such that each of (La,t, Ua,t)’s is (i) Ft−1-measurable
and (ii) regulates the suboptimality of action a at time t: more specifically, (ii) means that
Qz,int (a1:t−1, az,∗t )−Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) ≤ Uaz,∗t ,t − Lat,t, ∀at ∈ A (∗∗)
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holds with a high probability 1− δ. Following from Proposition 6,
W z(T,y)− V (piz, T,y) (141)
= E
[
T∑
t=1
Qz,int (api1:t−1, a
z,∗
t )−Qz,int (api1:t−1, apit )
]
(142)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
Pt−1[(∗∗) fails] + Et−1
[
Qz,int (api1:t−1, a
z,∗
t )−Qz,int (api1:t−1, apit )
∣∣∣ (∗∗) holds]] (143)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
δ + Et−1
[
Uaz,∗t ,t − Lapit ,t
]]
(144)
= Tδ + E
[
T∑
t=1
Uapit ,t − Lapit ,t
]
(145)
where Pt−1[·] , P[·|Ft−1] and Et−1[·] , E[·|Ft−1]. The last equality follows from
Et−1
[
Uaz,∗t ,t
]
=
K∑
a=1
Ua,t × Pt−1 [az,∗t = a] =
K∑
a=1
Ua,t × Pt−1 [apit = a] = Et−1
[
Uapit ,t
]
(146)
by the predictability of Ua,t with respect to F and Proposition 7. Note that (145) accumu-
lates Uapit ,t − Lapit ,t, which is the length of confidence interval of the action apit taken by the
policy at each time. We will show that, whenever the policy pulls an arm a, the confidence
interval of that arm shrinks, and therefore the entire suboptimality cannot grow too fast.
Some facts in the Beta-Bernoulli MAB. Before proving Theorem 3, we characterize
the Bayesian estimate µa,n in the Beta-Bernoulli MAB problem in which θa ∼ Beta(αa, βa)
and Ra,n ∼ Bernoulli(θa). After observing the first n reward realizations, recall that the
Bayesian update results in
θa|(Ra,1, · · · , Ra,n) ∼ Beta
(
αa +
n∑
s=1
Ra,n, βa + n−
n∑
s=1
Ra,n
)
, µa,n =
αa +
∑n
s=1Ra,s
αa + βa + n
.
(147)
Note that {µa,n}n≥0 is a Martingale such that starts from µa,0 = αaαa+βa and converges to
limn→∞ µa,n = θa. Roughly speaking, the (unconditional) distribution of µa,n, starting from
a point mass αa
αa+βa , diffuses toward Beta(αa, βa) which is the prior distribution of θa.
5 In
the following lemma, we further characterize the distribution of µa,n more formally.
Lemma 2. µa,n is n4(αa+βa)(αa+βa+n)-sub-Gaussian, i.e.,
E [exp (λ(µa,n − E[µa,n]))] ≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa)(αa + βa + n)
)
, ∀λ ∈ R (148)
Proof. Since (i) E[µa,n] = µa,0 = αaαa+βa , (ii) Ra,n’s are i.i.d. conditioned on θa, (iii) Bernoulli(θa)
is 14 -sub-Gaussian (for any θa) and (iv) Beta(α, β) is
1
4(α+β+1) -sub-Gaussian (Marchal and Arbel,
5Conditioned on θa, {µa,n}n≥0 is no longer a Martingale and the distribution of µa,n starts from a point
mass αaαa+βa , diffuses for a while, and ends up at a point mass θa. With the randomness of θa, {µa,n}n≥0 is
a Martingale and the distribution of µa,n gets widened as n increases.
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2017). For any λ ∈ R,
E [exp (λ(µa,n − µa,0))] (149)
= E
[
exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
×
(
(αa +
n∑
s=1
Ra,s)− (αa + βa + n)µa,0
))]
(150)
(i)= E
[
exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
×
(
n∑
s=1
(Ra,s − θa) + n · (θa − µa,0)
))]
(151)
= E
[
E
{
exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
×
n∑
s=1
(Ra,s − θa)
)∣∣∣∣∣ θa
}
× exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
× n · (θa − µa,0)
)]
(152)
(ii)= E
[
E
{
exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
× (Ra,1 − θa)
)∣∣∣∣ θa}n × exp( λαa + βa + n × n · (θa − µa,0)
)]
(153)
(iii)
≤ E
[{
exp
(
λ2
2(αa + βa + n)2
× 14
)}n
× exp
(
λ
αa + βa + n
× n · (θa − µa,0)
)]
(154)
= exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa + n)2
)
× E
[
exp
(
λn
αa + βa + n
× (θa − µa,0)
)]
(155)
(iv)
≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa + n)2
)
× exp
(
λ2n2
2(αa + βa + n)2
× 14(αa + βa + 1)
)
(156)
≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa + n)2
)
× exp
(
λ2n2
2(αa + βa + n)2
× 14(αa + βa)
)
(157)
= exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n(αa + βa) + n2
4(αa + βa + n)2(αa + βa)
)
= exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa + n)(αa + βa)
)
(158)

(1) Suboptimality analysis of TS (23). Define
∆a,t ,
√
log T
npit−1(a)
, Ua,t , min
{
µa,npit−1(a) + ∆a,t, 1
}
, La,t , max
{
µa,npit−1(a) −∆a,t, 0
}
(159)
where npit−1(a) , nt−1(api1:t−1, a) represents how many times the policy pi had pulled an arm a
before time t. (La,t, Ua,t) constructs the confidence interval on µa(θa) (= θa) at time t and it is
Ft−1-measurable. Conditioned on Ft−1, µa(θa) is distributed with Beta(αa + ∑npit−1(a)s=1 Ra,s, βa +
npit−1(a)−
∑npit−1(a)
s=1 Ra,s) which is 14(αa+βa+npit−1(a)+1) -sub-Gaussian. By Chernoff inequality,
Pt−1 [µa(θa) ≥ Ua,t] = Pt−1
[
µa(θa)− µa,npit−1(a) ≥ ∆a,t
]
≤ exp
(
− ∆
2
a,t
2× (4(αa + βa + npit−1(a) + 1))−1
)
(160)
≤ exp
(
−2npit−1(a)×
log T
npit−1(a)
)
= 1
T 2
(161)
Similarly, we have Pt−1 [µa(θa) ≤ La,t] ≤ 1T 2 . We define an event E in which (La,t, Ua,t) is indeed a
valid confidence interval for every arm a at every time t:
E , {µa(θa) ∈ (La,t, Ua,t) , ∀a, ∀t} (162)
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Following from the above concentration inequalities, the sequence of confidence intervals fails to
contain the true mean µa(θa) with a very low probability:
P [Ec] ≤ E
[
K∑
a=1
T∑
t=1
Pt−1 [µa(θa) ≥ Ua,t] + Pt−1 [µa(θa) ≤ La,t]
]
≤ 2K
T
. (163)
With zTSt , the Q-value of the inner problem is
Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) = µat(θat) + (T − t)× µa∗t (θa∗t ) (164)
On the event E , in which µa(θa) ∈ (La,t, Ua,t) for all a, we have
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a∗t )−Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) = µa∗t (θa∗t )− µat(θat) ≤ Ua∗t ,t − Lat,t. (165)
As outlined earlier, the total suboptimality of piTS is limited by
WTS(T,y)−V (piTS, T,y) ≤ T×P [Ec]+E
[
T∑
t=1
Uapit ,t − Lapit ,t
]
≤ 2K+E
[
K∑
a=1
T∑
t=1
min(1, 2∆a,t) · 1{apit = a}
]
.
(166)
For each arm a = 1, · · · ,K,
T∑
t=1
min(1, 2∆a,t)·1{apit = a} ≤ 1+
npiT (a)∑
n=2
2
√
log T
n− 1 ≤ 1+2
√
log T×
∫ npiT (a)
x=0
dx√
x
≤ 1+4√log T×√npiT (a)
(167)
By Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and since ∑Ka=1 npiT (a) = T ,
K∑
a=1
(
1 + 4
√
log T ×
√
npiT (a)
)
≤ K + 4√log T ×
√√√√K K∑
a=1
npiT (a) = K + 4
√
log T ×
√
KT. (168)
Combining all results,
WTS(T,y)− V (piTS, T,y) ≤ 3K + 4√log T ×√KT. (169)

(2) Suboptimality analysis of Irs.FH (24). Note that zIrs.FHt yields
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a∗t )−Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) = µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+T−t − µat,npit−1(at)+T−t (170)
When t = 1, µa,npit−1(a)+T−t coincides with µa,T−1. We need to bound µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+T−t instead of
µa(θa). Note that, conditioned on Ft−1, {µa,npit−1(a)+n}n≥0 is a Martingale whose distribution starts
from a point mass µa,npit−1(a) and diffuses toward the prior distribution Beta(αa+
∑npit−1(a)
s=1 Ra,s, βa+
npit−1(a)−
∑npit−1(a)
s=1 Ra,s). For any a and n ≥ 0, by Lemma 2, we have
Et−1
[
exp(λ(µa,npit−1(a)+n − µa,npit−1(a)))
]
≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4(αa + βa + npit−1(a))(αa + βa + npit−1(a) + n)
)
(171)
≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
n
4npit−1(a)(npit−1(a) + n)
)
(172)
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With n = T − t, we can conclude that µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+T−t is T−t4npit−1(a)(T−t+npit−1(a)) -sub-Gaussian.
Define
∆a,t ,
√
T − t
npit−1(a) + T − t
× log T
npit−1(a)
, Ua,t , min
{
µa,npit−1(a) + ∆a,t, 1
}
, La,t , max
{
µa,npit−1(a) −∆a,t, 0
}
(173)
By Chernoff inequality,
Pt−1
[
µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+T−t ≥ Ua,t
]
= Pt−1
[
µa,T−1 − µa,npit−1(a) ≥ ∆a,t
]
(174)
≤ exp
− ∆2a,t
2× T−t4npit−1(a)(T−t+npit−1(a))
 = exp (−2 log T ) = 1
T 2
(175)
Similarly, we can show Pt−1
[
µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+T−t ≤ La,t
]
≤ 1
T 2 . Analogous to the proof of TS,
WTS(T,y)− V (piTS, T,y) ≤ 2K + E
[
K∑
a=1
T∑
t=1
min(1, 2∆a,t) · 1{apit = a}
]
. (176)
Since npit−1(a) ≤ t, we have T−tnpit−1(a)+T−t =
(
1 + n
pi
t−1(a)
T−t
)−1
≤
(
1 + n
pi
t−1(a)
T−npit−1(a)
)−1
= 1− n
pi
t−1(a)
T and
∆a,t ≤
√√√√(1− npit−1(a)
T
)
× log T
npit−1(a)
=
√
log T×
√
1
npit−1(a)
− 1
T
≤ √log T×
 1√
npit−1(a)
−
√
npit−1(a)
2T
 .
(177)
Consequently, for each a,
T∑
t=1
min(1, 2∆a,t) · 1{apit = a} ≤ 1 + 2
√
log T ×
npiT (a)∑
n=2
(
1√
n− 1 −
√
n− 1
2T
)
(178)
≤ 1 + 2√log T × ∫ npiT (a)
x=0
(
1√
x
−
√
x
2T
)
(179)
= 1 + 2
√
log T ×
(
2
√
npiT (a)−
(npiT (a))3/2
3T
)
(180)
Note that, since x3/2 is a convex function and ∑Ka=1 npiT (a) = T ,
K∑
a=1
(npiT (a))3/2 ≥
K∑
a=1
(
T
K
)3/2
=
√
T 3/K (181)
By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, as in TS, we have ∑Ka=1√npiT (a) ≤ √KT . As a result,
WTS(T,y)− V (piTS, T,y) ≤ 2K + E
[
K∑
a=1
1 + 2
√
log T ×
(
2
√
npiT (a)−
(npiT (a))3/2
3T
)]
(182)
≤ 3K + 2√log T × (2√KT − 13
√
T/K
)
. (183)

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(3) Suboptimality analysis of Irs.V-Zero (25). Consider an optimal solution n∗ of inner
problem of Irs.V-Zero when the remaining time is T . As long as the optimal solution allocates
at least one pull on an arm a, i.e., n∗(a) > 0, pulling the arm a does not incur suboptimality (such
arms are all optimal and their Q-values tie). The suboptimality is incurred only when pulling a
suboptimal arm a (such that n∗(a) = 0), in which we lose mina′:n∗(a′)>0{µa′,n∗(a′)−1} − µa,0 (it
loses the last pull of one of optimal arms) where the term mina′:n∗(a′)>0{µa′,n∗(a′)−1} is limited by
max0≤n≤T−1 µa∗,n for some a∗ such that n∗(a∗) > 0. Extending this argument, in the midst of the
process, when the remaining time is T − t+ 1, we have
Qz,int (a1:t−1, a∗t )−Qz,int (a1:t−1, at) ≤ max0≤n≤T−t
{
µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+n
}
− µat,npit−1(at). (184)
What we need to do is the regulation of max0≤n≤T−t
{
µa∗t ,npit−1(a∗t )+n
}
. As before, we define
∆a,t ,
√
T − t
npit−1(a) + T − t
× log T
npit−1(a)
, Ua,t , min
{
µa,npit−1(a) + ∆a,t, 1
}
, La,t , µa,npit−1(a) (185)
Note that we take La,t different from the previous case, but still Ft−1-measurable. Given that
{µa,npit−1(a)+n − µa,npit−1(a)}n≥0 is a Martingale,
{
exp
(
λ(µa,npit−1(a)+n − µa,npit−1(a))
)}
n≥0 is a non-
negative supermartingale due to the convexity of exp(·). By Doob’s maximal inequality and Lemma
2, for any λ ≥ 0,
Pt−1
[
max
0≤n≤T−t
{
µa,npit−1(a)+n
}
≥ Ua,t
]
= Pt−1
[
max
0≤n≤T−t
{
µa,npit−1(a)+n − µa,npit−1(a)
}
≥ ∆a,t
]
(186)
≤ Pt−1
[
max
0≤n≤T−t
{
exp
(
λ(µa,npit−1(a)+n − µa,npit−1(a))
)}
≥ ∆a,t
]
(187)
≤
Et−1
[
exp
(
λ(µa,npit−1(a)+T−t − µa,npit−1(a))
)]
exp(λ∆a,t)
(188)
≤ exp
(
λ2
2 ×
T − t
4npit−1(a)(npit−1(a) + T − t)
− λ∆a,t
)
(189)
For λ that minimizes RHS and ∆a,t defined above,
Pt−1
[
max
0≤n≤T−t
{
µa,npit−1(a)+n
}
≥ Ua,t
]
≤ exp
(
−2n
pi
t−1(a)(npit−1(a) + T − t)
T − t ×∆
2
a,t
)
= 1
T 2
(190)
Note that max0≤n≤T−t
{
µa,npit−1(a)+n
}
≥ La,t ≡ µa,npit−1(a) by its defintion. We have shown that
P
[
E ,
{
max
0≤n≤T−t
{
µa,npit−1(a)+n
}
∈ [La,t, Ua,t), ∀a,∀t
}]
≥ 1− K
T
(191)
Therefore, using the facts derived for TS and Irs.FH,
WTS(T,y)− V (piTS, T,y) ≤ TP[Ec] + E
[
T∑
t=1
Uapit ,t − Lapit ,t
]
(192)
≤ K + E
[
K∑
a=1
T∑
t=1
min(1,∆a,t)1{apit = a}
]
(193)
≤ 2K +√log T × (2√KT − 13
√
T/K
)
. (194)
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D. Numerical Experiments in Detail
D.1. Setups
In this section, we illustrate the detailed simulation procedure. Given a MAB problem
instance specified by the prior distribution Pa(ya) and the reward distribution Ra(θa), we
simulate the policies and calculate the IRS bounds for each T separately up to Tmax.
Let S be the number of simulations we perform. For each i ∈ [S], we first sample the
parameters θ(i)a ∼ Pa(ya) and the rewards R(i)a,n ∼ Ra(θ(i)a ) for all n ∈ [Tmax] and a ∈ A. And
then for each T ∈ {5, 10, 15, · · · , Tmax}, we simulate each policy pi (that can utilize the time
horizon T ): when the policy pulls an arm apit at time t, it earns a reward R
(i)
apit ,nt(api1:t,apit )
and
this reward realization is feedbacked to the policy; and this procedure is repeated over t =
1, · · · , T . After simulating one sample path api1:T ,
∑T
t=1 µapit (θ
(i)
apit
) is recorded as a performance
of pi for the ith sample, and the expected performance V (pi, T,y) is measured by its sample
average over S samples.
For each of IRS bounds, similarly, we solve the associated inner problem over the same
set of samples ω˜(1), · · · , ω˜(S) for each T ∈ {5, 10, · · · , Tmax}. The IRS bound W z(T,y) is
evaluated by taking average of the maximal values over S samples.
More explicitly, we use the following sample averages to calculate V (pi, T,y) andW z(T,y):
V (pi, T,y) ≈ 1
S
S∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
µapit (θ
(i)
apit
)
)
, W z(T,y) ≈ 1
S
S∑
i=1
max
a1:T∈AT
{
T∑
t=1
rt(a1:t;ω(i))− zt(a1:t;ω(i))
}
.
(195)
Note again that the same outcome ω(i) is used across the different values of time horizon T
and across algorithms. Sharing the randomness enhances the consistency of the estimates
across T and algorithms.
Based on V (pi, T,y) and WTS(T,y) measured with sample averages, we calculate the
Bayesian regret of a policy pi: for each T ,
WTS(T,y)− V (pi, T,y) = E
[
T∑
t=1
max
a
µa(θa)− µapit (θapit )
]
, (196)
which coincides with its conventional definition. We also interpret WTS(T,y)−W z(T,y) as a
regret (lower) bound following from zt, since WTS(T,y)−V (pi, T,y) ≥ WTS(T,y)−W z(T,y)
for any pi ∈ ΠF by weak duality. In what follow, we use 20,000 samples (S = 20, 000).
D.2. Beta-Bernoulli MAB
Two arms (K = 2). We first provide the results for Beta-Bernoulli MAB with two arms in
which
θa ∼ Beta(1, 1), Ra,n ∼ Bernoulli(θa), ∀a ∈ [K]. (197)
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We consider relatively short time horizons (≤ Tmax = 200) since we focus on the finite horizon
regime rather than asymptotic regime.
Figure 2 shows the regrets (solid lines) and the regret bounds (dashed lines) of all algo-
rithms being considered in our paper. In particular for this case where the state (belief)
space is discrete and small in its size, O(T 4), we are able to solve Bellman equations (4)
numerically that is shown with a curve labeled as Opt. Compared to Opt, we observe that
all policies are nearly optimal. In Table 2, even for TS that exhibits the worst performance,
its regret differs only by 1.5 compared to Opt when T = 200, which means that it chooses
the suboptimal arms only six times more than Opt does, in average.
Amongst IRS algorithms, we observe a clear improvement in both performances and
bounds as we incorporate more complicated penalty functions from TS to Irs.V-EMax.
As visualized in Figure 2, the regret curve approaches to Opt from above and the bound
curve approaches from below, which is consistent with the implication of Theorem 3. The
strong duality states that, with ideal penalty, those two curves would meet at Opt, yielding
zero suboptimality gap. However, we face a trade-off between the running time and the
quality of policy/bound, as shown in Table 2.
We finally remark the near-optimality of Irs.Index policy. It outperforms to all the other
policies, surprisingly close to Opt. Despite that it is developed based on Irs.V-EMax, it
performs better than Irs.V-EMax, which leaves a necessity of further studies.
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Figure 2: Regret plot for Beta-Bernoulli MAB with two arms.
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Algorithm Bayesian regret (std error) Performance bound (std error) Running time
TS 3.45 (0.021) 133.22 (0.332) 17 ms
Irs.FH 3.17 (0.020) 133.13 (0.331) 37 ms
Irs.V-Zero 2.87 (0.021) 132.32 (0.318) 527 ms
Irs.V-EMax 2.70 (0.020) 131.79 (0.008) 29.5 sec
Irs.Index 2.29 (0.023) - 3.6 sec
Bayes-UCB 2.72 (0.020) - 44 ms
IDS 2.43 (0.028) - 3.7 sec
OGI 2.43 (0.028) - 262 ms
Opt 2.24 (-) 131.09 (-) -
Table 2: Summary statistics of the algorithms in Beta-Bernoulli MAB when K = 2 and
T = 200. The last column shows the average time required to simulate one sample path
throughout t = 1, · · · , T .
Ten arms (K = 10). We consider Beta-Bernoulli MAB with ten arms (K = 10) and
Beta(1, 1) priors. Figure 3 and Table 3 show the results for the time horizons T ≤ Tmax = 500.
We no longer have Irs.V-EMax and Opt because of the computation cost. Nevertheless,
we still observe that IRS algorithms have a monotonicity in both performances and bounds,
and Irs.Index policy performs best.
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Figure 3: Regret plot for Beta-Bernoulli MAB with ten arms.
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Algorithm Bayesian regret (std error) Performance bound (std error) Running time
TS 23.59 (0.078) 454.01 (0.298) 50 ms
Irs.FH 22.08 (0.076) 453.59 (0.297) 300 ms
Irs.V-Zero 19.54 (0.074) 450.20 (0.290) 17.0 sec
Irs.Index 13.62 (0.080) - 56.2 sec
Bayes-UCB 17.77 (0.077) - 140 ms
IDS 14.67 (0.093) - 16.4 sec
OGI 15.04 (0.092) - 2.6 sec
Table 3: Summary statistics of algorithms in Beta-Bernoulli MAB when K = 10 and T = 500.
D.3. Gaussian MAB
Two arms (K = 2). We consider a case such that
θa ∼ N (0, 12), Ra,n ∼ N (θa, 12), ∀a ∈ [K]. (198)
As shown in Figure 4 and Table 4, we observe the results similar to Beta-Bernoulli MABs.
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Figure 4: Regret plot for Gaussian MAB with two arms.
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Algorithm Bayesian regret (std error) Performance bound (std error) Running time
TS 7.47 (0.047) 112.75 (1.162) 17 ms
Irs.FH 6.94 (0.045) 112.37 (1.163) 37 ms
Irs.V-Zero 6.38 (0.048) 110.27 (1.150) 625 ms
Irs.V-EMax 5.97 (0.044) 109.27 (0.018) 13.3 sec
Irs.Index 5.12 (0.054) - 2.2 sec
Bayes-UCB 6.16 (0.045) - 38 ms
IDS 5.58 (0.068) - 679 ms
OGI 5.57 (0.067) - 196 ms
Table 4: Summary statistics of algorithms in Gaussian MAB when K = 2 and T = 200.
Ten arms (K = 10). The results are provided in Figure 5 and Table 5.
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Figure 5: Regret plot for Guassian MAB with ten arms.
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Algorithm Bayesian regret (std error) Performance bound (std error) Running time
TS 58.28 (0.180) 766.88 (2.069) 35 ms
Irs.FH 56.20 (0.180) 766.40 (2.068) 215 ms
Irs.V-Zero 52.46 (0.188) 758.85 (2.049) 13.7 sec
Irs.Index 39.40 (0.244) - 30.4 sec
Bayes-UCB 51.40 (0.178) - 77 ms
IDS 46.41 (0.324) - 4.0 sec
OGI 49.63 (0.335) - 1.6 sec
Table 5: Summary statistics of algorithms in Gaussian MAB when K = 10 and T = 500.
Five arms with different noise variances. We provide Table 6 that shows the results
for the case discussed in §5.
Algorithm Bayesian regret (std error) Performance bound (std error) Running time
TS 121.99 (0.615) 585.17 (2.377) 34 ms
Irs.FH 103.03 (0.628) 573.42 (2.337) 128 ms
Irs.V-Zero 89.59 (0.690) 546.71 (2.248) 7.4 sec
Irs.Index 100.20 (0.657) - 12.8 sec
Irs.Index* 72.43 (0.866) - 12.3 sec
Bayes-UCB 220.66 (1.285) - 88 ms
IDS 94.63 (0.817) - 2.9 sec
OGI 151.61 (1.030) - 829 ms
Table 6: Summary statistics of algorithms in Gaussian MAB when K = 5, T = 500 and
σ1:K = (0.1, 0.4, 1, 4, 10). Irs.Index* is a variant of Irs.Index introduced in §A.3.
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